![]() Third, we accept that some people find kidney sales inherently problematic but argue that there are compelling reasons why they should tolerate the mutually beneficial market engagement of kidney sellers and buyers. ![]() Second, we argue that since unpaid kidney donations have become officially welcome, there is in fact no convincing argument why selling a kidney for a price should be regarded as a violation of a seller’s human dignity, while possible violations of a seller’s social dignity can be avoided by prudent market regulation. Once this is taken into account, from a normative point of view saving lives clearly trumps minor harm reductions. We then argue that this has to be weighed against the dignity violation of a kidney patient who is deprived of receiving a lifesaving transplant due to market prohibition. First, we assume-for the sake of argument-that a seller’s dignity might be violated by participating in a kidney market. Our counterarguments build on each other. Next, we formulate three counterarguments against the view that concern for human (and social) dignity requires a prohibition of kidney markets. In the following section, we distinguish between human and social dignity and thereby reconstruct the argument by which opponents of kidney markets justify the status quo’s reliance on altruism. We develop our line of argumentation in three steps. The overall aim is to advance the academic and public debate on the moral legitimacy of kidney sales. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to clarify the normative stance of the concern for dignity in the debate and to propose three consecutive counterarguments that challenge the status quo’s reliance on altruism in favour of a market-based solution. ![]() Scholars on both sides of this trade-off between saving more lives and preserving dignity have concentrated on shifting the burden of proof to the opposite camp-an indicator that the debate has not made much progress since its inception. One essential field of tension is marked by the contention that although introducing (well-regulated) kidney markets would save more lives, it would also seem to violate and undermine the preservation of dignity (Gillespie 2017). While the empirical potency of kidney markets is reaching consensus among scholars, their normative implications are a matter of dispute (Elías, Lacetera, and Macis 2017, 490). Becker and Elías ( 2007), for instance, estimate that payments between $15,000 and $30,000 would eliminate the waiting list within a few years. On balance, the kidney shortage is a global phenomenon that prevails despite decades of efforts with various altruism-based policies.Īn argument has been made that there is an evident solution to this “organ disaster” (Beard and Osterkamp 2014): pay people for donating their kidneys. ![]() The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to further compound the shortage since people with COVID-19 are predisposed to kidney disease (Henry and Lippi 2020). 1 Meanwhile, the yearly number of patients added to the waiting list regularly exceeds the actual number of transplantations-exacerbating the shortage in kidneys and consequently inducing more preventable deaths and a thriving black market with its problems for buyers and sellers. Every year, around 9,000 patients on that waiting list die or become too sick to undergo transplantation. Yet, this very achievement creates a moral problem: many more lives could be saved if potential donors were not only permitted to provide a kidney for free but also for money.Īs of this writing, 95,000 patients in the United States are on the waiting list for a kidney transplant. ![]() The ability to transplant a kidney from a deceased or living donor is no doubt one of the greatest achievements in the history of medicine. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |